Check the minting policy ID before you accept anything called WHAT

On Cardano, anyone can mint a token, call it WHAT, use this ticker and put this logo on it. There is no registry that stops them and no authority that could. The name is not the thing.

The thing is the minting policy IDThe identifier of a Cardano token's minting policy, and the only thing that tells the real WHAT from a token with the same name and logo. Here it is the hash of the validator script with this chain's three parameters applied — the script's own hash, before them, is not a policy ID. The validator's address is built from that same hash, used as its payment credential, so the two come from one value without being the same string. — the script hash of the validator that governs this token. The validator's address on Cardano is built from that same hash, as its payment credential, so one value gives you both; they are not the same string and a wallet will not show you the two interchangeably. Compare the policy ID of whatever you were handed against the one this project publishes, and the question is settled, in either direction.

whitepaper §5

Derive it yourself, from the source and three parameters

The policy ID is the hash of the validator script with three parameters applied: the genesis UTxOAn unspent transaction output, the unit Cardano's ledger is made of: an amount, the data attached to it, and the address that governs it., the hash of the genesisThe chain's first block, whose commitment embeds the headline of a news article from launch day. header, and the targetThe number a header's hash has to come in under for the block to be valid; a lower target means more work. the chain starts at. Those three are what make this policy this chain's rather than an identically written one's, and the first of them can be spent only once, so no second chain can ever claim this ID.

All three are settled before the first block is mined, so the ID is published ahead of that block rather than after it. The genesis header is built rather than mined, and it commits a news headline from launch day — so the fields below are empty because that header does not exist yet, not because the value is unknowable until the chain runs.

1 · The validator
The Plutus script the policy ID is derived from. Either as a published script hash, or as somewhere you can get the source and compile it yourself. b67d2ad5a617642ad586fc1738e2ec947c7d2336ba7c1a36f23ac505 Validator script hash, before any chain's parameters are applied — so it is not a policy ID and nothing offered to you as WHAT should match it. What it checks is that the published source compiles to the script this project claims.
2 · The three parameters
Applied to the script in this order. The first is one spendable output on Cardano's ledger; the second is the hash of the header the chain starts from, which is what binds the launch-day headline to the policy ID; the third is the target the first miner works against. Not published yet — 3 January 2027 Genesis UTxO reference. Published once genesis has run and before the first block is mined. Not published yet — 3 January 2027 Genesis header hash. Built on launch day, because it commits that day's headline — the one parameter nobody can derive ahead of that day. Not published yet — 3 January 2027 Starting target. Chosen before genesis and fixed by it, after which the rule in §6 moves it on every block.
3 · The resulting policy ID
The hash of the validator with all three of field 2 applied. It is the minting policy ID, it is the payment credential of the validator's address, and it is what you check anything offered to you as WHAT against. Not published yet — 3 January 2027 Determined the moment all three parameters exist, which is when genesis runs, and published with them. Empty here for the same reason field 2 is. Not yet assigned Asset name. Not yet assigned Asset fingerprint.
Fig. 8 — The three fields in derivation order, with the recipe beside them. The only interaction is copy and compare, so the check runs anywhere, with or without this page.

whitepaper §5

There is no key to check a signature against

A script policy has no policy key to sign with, because the policy is the script. So there is nothing we could sign to prove this is the real one, and nothing you would check a signature against. The identity is the hash, and you can compute it yourself.

That is a stronger position than a signature, not a weaker one: a key can be stolen or coerced, and a hash of a published script cannot.

The same hash answers the other question people arrive with, which is who can change the rules.