A block reward buys one thing, and Bitcoin credits it with two

Saying the work here secures nothing sounds like saying it is pointless. It is not, and the reason is in what a block reward actually pays for.

It pays for producer selection: who extends the chain next. Names are free, so the right to produce has to be bought with something, or one operator can be a thousand identities. In Bitcoin the tickets are hashes; under Cardano's Ouroboros they are stake. As Sybil defenses the two are symmetric — each makes control of selection cost more than control pays.

whitepaper §2

The second thing is credited, not bought

The second thing is ordering: which of several conflicting but individually valid histories is canonical, and what it costs to revise one at depth. On Bitcoin that cost is denominated in the same hashes the reward buys, so the spend that selects producers is counted as the security of the history they produce. Nothing in the protocol separates the two to show how much of one the other actually buys.

A third property is bought by neither system's reward. Validity — what the rules accept — is enforced unpaid by every full node, and no quantity of hashpower changes it. [whitepaper: §11]

Handing out the coins is not any of the three, and the quickest way to see it is to ask what announcing it in advance would cost. Saying a year ahead who will receive the coins gives an attacker nothing. Saying who will write block 940,000 gives them a target and a schedule.

whitepaper §3

WHAT separates them

Ordering here is Cardano's, denominated in stake, and so is the selection of the producers who make the blocks WHAT lives in. The work selects only who is paid the next reward.

So this chain pays Bitcoin's full reward schedule for a selection that secures nothing, with ordering already settled by stake, and records what the hashpower does next. That record is a reading of what the credit was worth.

Fig. 0 — The split. Work's side of the line holds only the question of who is paid. Cardano and the validator hold validity, ordering and producer selection, along with double-spend prevention, timekeeping, difficulty adjustment and settlement. The two tiers do not cooperate on consensus; the upper one has no consensus role in any degree.

whitepaper §2

What makes it a reading

Hashes and stake are symmetric as Sybil defenses. They are not symmetric in what holds a selected producer to the protocol, and that asymmetry is what the reading rests on.

Hashes are a flow. Hardware and electricity are committed to SHA-256d, not to any chain, and pointing them at a chain buys no position in it. A miner follows the protocol because the reward is the best available use of its hardware, and when something pays better it leaves at no loss.

Stake is a stock. It has to be bought in the chain's own coin, cannot be moved to another network, and a producer that breaks the protocol lowers the value of what it holds. That is a difference in what the resource is, not a ranking of the two mechanisms, and we make no claim about which secures better.

So Proof of What? is a proof-of-stake chain, and the work has the one job drawn above. Whether stake holds ordering as well as work does is Ouroboros's claim to defend, and it defends it in the peer-reviewed record. This design inherits that answer with its assumptions, an honest majority of stake among them; a reader who rejects the claim should reject this chain with it.

Work secures nothing here, so the next thing to be exact about is the claim.